We consider the design of platforms that facilitate trade between a single seller and a single
buyer. The most efficient mechanisms for such settings are complex and sometimes even …

We consider the bilateral trade problem, in which two agents trade a single indivisible item. It
is known that the only dominant-strategy truthful mechanism is the fixed-price mechanism …

We continue the study of the performance for fixed-price mechanisms in the bilateral trade
problem, and improve approximation ratios of welfare-optimal mechanisms in several …

Two individuals face a regular task that requires the effort of only one. They take turns but
sometimes arrange to swap obligations. These swaps account for their changing, private …

We study optimal mechanisms for a utilitarian designer who seeks to assign a finite number
of goods to a group of ex ante heterogeneous agents with unit demand. The agents have …

A committee decides collectively whether to accept a given proposal or to maintain the
status quo. Committee members are privately informed about their valuations and monetary …

In this paper, we consider the problem of allocating an indivisible good efficiently between
two agents with monetary transfers. We focus on allocation mechanisms that are dominant …

In the private values single object auction model, we construct a satisfactory mechanism—a
dominant strategy incentive compatible and budget-balanced mechanism satisfying equal …

This paper studies fixed-price mechanisms in bilateral trade with ex ante symmetric agents.
We show that the optimal price is particularly simple: it is exactly equal to the mean of the …

In the private values single object auction model, we construct a satisfactory mechanism–a
symmetric, dominant strategy incentive compatible, and budget-balanced mechanism. The …