We consider the fundamental problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among
strategic agents with additive valuation functions. It is well known that, in the absence of …

A recent line of work in mechanism design has focused on guaranteeing incentive
compatibility for agents without contingent reasoning skills: obviously strategyproof …

The realization that selfish interests need to be accounted for in the design of algorithms has
produced many interesting and valuable contributions in computer science under the …

We consider the setting of combinatorial auctions when the agents are single-minded and
have no contingent reasoning skills. We are interested in mechanisms that provide the right …

Catering to the incentives of people with limited rationality is a challenging research
direction that requires novel paradigms to design mechanisms. Obviously strategy-proof …

Catering to the incentives of people with limited rationality is a challenging research
direction that requires novel paradigms to design mechanisms and approximation …

Adaptive incentives are a valuable tool shown to improve the efficiency of complex
multiagent systems and could produce win-win situations for all stakeholders. However, their …

Obvious strategyproofness (OSP) is an appealing concept as it allows to maintain incentive
compatibility even in the presence of agents that are not fully rational, ie, those who struggle …

Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms have recently come to the fore as a tool to deal
with imperfect rationality. They, in fact, incentivize people with no contingent reasoning skills …

In this article we survey the main research topics of our group at the University of Essex. Our
research interests lie at the intersection of theoretical computer science, artificial …