We construct a stream-cipher S whose implementation is secure even if a bounded amount
of arbitrary (adversarially chosen) information on the internal state ofS is leaked during …

We study the design of cryptographic primitives resilient to key-leakage attacks, where an
attacker can repeatedly and adaptively learn information about the secret key, subject only …

A weak pseudorandom function (wPRF) is a cryptographic primitive similar to–but weaker
than–a pseudorandom function: for wPRFs one only requires that the output is …

We construct the first public-key encryption scheme in the Bounded-Retrieval Model (BRM),
providing security against various forms of adversarial “key leakage” attacks. In this model …

We study the question of designing cryptographic schemes which are secure even if an
arbitrary function f (sk) of the secret key is leaked, as long as the secret key sk is still …

We consider what constitutes identities in cryptography. Typical examples include your
name and your social-security number, or your fingerprint/iris-scan, or your address, or your …

We design the first Leakage-Resilient Identity-Based Encryption (LR-IBE) systems from static
assumptions in the standard model. We derive these schemes by applying a hash proof …

In this work, we show that strong leakage resilience for cryptosystems with advanced
functionalities can be obtained quite naturally within the methodology of dual system …

A number of works have focused on the setting where an adversary tampers with the shares
of a secret sharing scheme. This includes literature on verifiable secret sharing, algebraic …

In this paper we give improved constructions of several central objects in the literature of
randomness extraction and tamper-resilient cryptography. Our main results are:(1) An …