Preference restrictions in computational social choice: A survey
Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked,
single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the …
single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the …
Practical approach to -Euclidean Preferences
M Dvořák, D Knop, J Pokorný, M Slávik - arxiv preprint arxiv:2502.07454, 2025 - arxiv.org
An election is a pair $(C, V) $ of candidates and voters. Each vote is a ranking (permutation)
of the candidates. An election is $ d $-Euclidean if there is an embedding of both candidates …
of the candidates. An election is $ d $-Euclidean if there is an embedding of both candidates …
Weighted majority tournaments and Kemeny ranking with 2-dimensional Euclidean preferences
B Escoffier, O Spanjaard, M Tydrichová - Discrete Applied Mathematics, 2022 - Elsevier
The assumption that voters' preferences share some common structure is a standard way to
circumvent NP-hardness results in social choice problems. While the Kemeny ranking …
circumvent NP-hardness results in social choice problems. While the Kemeny ranking …
[PDF][PDF] Algorithms for social choice in dynamic environments
J Israel - 2024 - depositonce.tu-berlin.de
In this thesis, we study algorithmic and axiomatic problems in multiple settings concerned
with collective decision-making when part of the input of the problem is unknown or changes …
with collective decision-making when part of the input of the problem is unknown or changes …
一种优化计算 slater 投票获胜者的 picat 方法.
敖欢， 王以松， 冯仁艳， 邓周灰… - Application Research of …, 2022 - search.ebscohost.com
slater 投票规则是基于锦标赛的投票规则, 主要是通过构造无环锦标赛, 找到与原锦标赛差异
最小的一个, 从中选出获胜者. 针对求解难度为NP 难的slater 投票算法, 提出了一种基于相似 …
最小的一个, 从中选出获胜者. 针对求解难度为NP 难的slater 投票算法, 提出了一种基于相似 …