When can we learn general-sum Markov games with a large number of players sample-efficiently?
Multi-agent reinforcement learning has made substantial empirical progresses in solving
games with a large number of players. However, theoretically, the best known sample …
games with a large number of players. However, theoretically, the best known sample …
Breaking the curse of multiagency: Provably efficient decentralized multi-agent rl with function approximation
A unique challenge in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) is the\emph {curse of
multiagency}, where the description length of the game as well as the complexity of many …
multiagency}, where the description length of the game as well as the complexity of many …
Online learning in stackelberg games with an omniscient follower
We study the problem of online learning in a two-player decentralized cooperative
Stackelberg game. In each round, the leader first takes an action, followed by the follower …
Stackelberg game. In each round, the leader first takes an action, followed by the follower …
The sample complexity of online contract design
We study the hidden-action principal-agent problem in an online setting. In each round, the
principal posts a contract that specifies the payment to the agent based on each outcome …
principal posts a contract that specifies the payment to the agent based on each outcome …
Towards general function approximation in zero-sum markov games
This paper considers two-player zero-sum finite-horizon Markov games with simultaneous
moves. The study focuses on the challenging settings where the value function or the model …
moves. The study focuses on the challenging settings where the value function or the model …
Welfare maximization in competitive equilibrium: Reinforcement learning for markov exchange economy
We study a bilevel economic system, which we refer to as a Markov exchange economy
(MEE), from the point of view of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). An MEE …
(MEE), from the point of view of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). An MEE …
A survey of decision making in adversarial games
In many practical applications, such as poker, chess, drug interdiction, cybersecurity, and
national defense, players often have adversarial stances, ie, the selfish actions of each …
national defense, players often have adversarial stances, ie, the selfish actions of each …
Parl: A unified framework for policy alignment in reinforcement learning from human feedback
We present a novel unified bilevel optimization-based framework,\textsf {PARL}, formulated
to address the recently highlighted critical issue of policy alignment in reinforcement …
to address the recently highlighted critical issue of policy alignment in reinforcement …
Can reinforcement learning find stackelberg-nash equilibria in general-sum markov games with myopic followers?
We study multi-player general-sum Markov games with one of the players designated as the
leader and the other players regarded as followers. In particular, we focus on the class of …
leader and the other players regarded as followers. In particular, we focus on the class of …
Computing optimal equilibria and mechanisms via learning in zero-sum extensive-form games
We introduce a new approach for computing optimal equilibria via learning in games. It
applies to extensive-form settings with any number of players, including mechanism design …
applies to extensive-form settings with any number of players, including mechanism design …