Over the past two decades, experimental economics has moved from a fringe activity to
become a standard tool for empirical research. With experimental economics now regarded …

We experimentally study the Gale and Shapley, 1962 mechanism, which is utilized in a wide
set of applications, most prominently the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) …

The paper surveys the experimental literature on matching markets. It covers house
allocation, school choice, and two-sided matching markets such as college admissions. The …

We present an experimental study of decentralized two-sided matching markets with no
transfers. Experimental participants are informed of everyone's preferences and can make …

This paper considers marriage problems, roommate problems with nonempty core, and
college admissions problems with responsive preferences. All stochastically stable …

In many matching markets, bargaining determines who matches with whom and on what
terms. We experimentally investigate allocative efficiency and how subjects' payoffs depend …

Suppose that the agents of a matching market contact each other randomly and form new
pairs if is in their interest. Does such a process always converge to a stable matching if one …

Vote trading is ubiquitous in committees and legislatures, and yet we know very little about
its properties. We explore this subject with a laboratory experiment. We propose a model of …

We design a laboratory experiment to investigate matching in a decentralized market of
deferred acceptance. Agents are undifferentiated and may have multiple partners; their …

The purpose of this paper is to determine what makes decentralized matching markets more
or less likely to be inclined toward efficient outcomes when efficiency is measured in terms of …