We consider the problem of computing a (pure) Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the first-price
auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when …

We study the complexity of finding an approximate (pure) Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a
first-price auction with common priors when the tie-breaking rule is part of the input. We …

First Price Auction is 1-1/<italic toggle='yes'>e</italic>² Efficient Page 1 36 First
Price Auction is 1 − 1/e2 Efficient YAONAN JIN, Huawei TCS Lab, China PINYAN LU …

We study the computational complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in first-price
auctions with discrete value distributions and discrete bidding space, under general …

Understanding the convergence properties of learning dynamics in repeated auctions is a
timely and important question in the area of learning in auctions, with numerous applications …

In this work, we investigate the problem of how to bid in repeated contextual first price
auctions for a single learner (the bidder). Concretely, at each time t, the learner receives a …

We study the performance of cash-and equity-bid security auctions in an experiment using
first-and second-price pricing rules. Theory predicts revenue equivalence between first-and …

Auction games have been widely used in plenty of trading environments such as online
advertising and real estate. The complexity of real-world scenarios, characterized by diverse …

We address the problem of solving complex Bayesian games, characterized by high-
dimensional type and action spaces, many (> 2) players, and general-sum payoffs. Our …

The upcoming 5G and beyond wireless networking technologies are intended to coexist with
different communication networks to solve the spectrum scarcity problem. The seamless …