In multiagent systems, strategic settings are often analyzed under the assumption that the
players choose their strategies simultaneously. However, this model is not always realistic …

In a class of games known as Stackelberg games, one agent (the leader) must commit to a
strategy that can be observed by the other agent (the follower or adversary) before the …

This book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design,
to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving …

Two minimal requirements for a satisfactory multiagent learning algorithm are that it 1. learns
to play optimally against stationary opponents and 2. converges to a Nash equilibrium in self …

Security is a concern of major importance to governments and companies throughout the
world. With limited resources, complete coverage of potential points of attack is not possible …

We provide a single reduction that demonstrates that in normal-form games:(1) it is NP-
complete to determine whether Nash equilibria with certain natural properties exist (these …

AI systems can interact in unexpected ways, sometimes with disastrous consequences. As
AI gets to control more of our world, these interactions will become more common and have …

1 Her work has been supported in part by an NRW grant for gender-sensitive universities
supporting her as a junior professor for Computational Social Choice and by the project …

Deployable Large Language Models (LLMs) must conform to the criterion of helpfulness and
harmlessness, thereby achieving consistency between LLMs outputs and human values …

Security at major locations of economic or political importance is a key concern around the
world, particularly given the threat of terrorism. Limited security resources prevent full …