Combinatorial civic crowdfunding with budgeted agents: welfare optimality at equilibrium and optimal deviation
Civic Crowdfunding (CC) uses the``power of the crowd" to garner contributions towards
public projects. As these projects are non-excludable, agents may prefer to``free-ride," …
public projects. As these projects are non-excludable, agents may prefer to``free-ride," …
Coordinating Monetary Contributions in Participatory Budgeting
We formalize a framework for coordinating funding and selecting projects, the costs of which
are shared among agents with quasi-linear utility functions and individual budgets. Our …
are shared among agents with quasi-linear utility functions and individual budgets. Our …
Cost sharing over combinatorial domains
We study the problem of designing cost-sharing mechanisms for combinatorial domains.
Suppose that multiple items or services are available to be shared among a set of interested …
Suppose that multiple items or services are available to be shared among a set of interested …
Check for Single-Peaked Jump Schelling Games Tobias Friedrich, Pascal Lenzner (), Louise Molitor, and Lars Seifert Hasso Plattner Institute, University of Potsdam …
SPJS Games - … Symposium, SAGT 2023, Egham, UK, September …, 2023 - books.google.com
Schelling games model the wide-spread phenomenon of residential segregation in
metropolitan areas from a game-theoretic point of view. In these games agents of different …
metropolitan areas from a game-theoretic point of view. In these games agents of different …