Double auction on diffusion network

M Li, Y Cao, D Zhao - Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial …, 2024 - ojs.aaai.org
Mechanism design on social networks has attracted extensive attention recently. The goal is
to design mechanisms to incentivize participants to invite more participants via their social …

[PDF][PDF] Mechanism Design Powered by Social Interactions: A Call to Arms.

D Zhao - IJCAI, 2022 - dengji-zhao.net
Mechanism design has traditionally assumed that the participants are fixed and
independent. However, in reality, the participants are well-connected (eg, via their social …

Diffusion multi-unit auctions with diminishing marginal utility buyers

H Liu, X Lian, D Zhao - ECAI 2023, 2023 - ebooks.iospress.nl
We consider an auction design problem where a seller sells multiple homogeneous items to
a set of connected buyers. Each buyer only knows the buyers she directly connects with and …

[PDF][PDF] Incentives for Early Arrival in Cooperative Games

Y Ge, Y Zhang, D Zhao, ZG Tang, H Fu… - Proceedings of the 23rd …, 2024 - dengji-zhao.net
Consider a frequent scenario, where a group of people form a partnership for a startup [20].
They have different abilities or funds to contribute and can cooperate to create values …

Distributed mechanism design in social networks

H Liu, Y Zhang, D Zhao - arxiv preprint arxiv:2303.03077, 2023 - arxiv.org
Designing auctions to incentivize buyers to invite new buyers via their social connections is
a new trend in mechanism design. The challenge is that buyers are competitors and we …

Incentives for Early Arrival in Cost Sharing

J Zhang, Y Zhang, Y Ge, D Zhao, H Fu… - arxiv preprint arxiv …, 2024 - arxiv.org
In cooperative games, we study how values created or costs incurred by a coalition are
shared among the members within it, and the players may join the coalition in a online …

Combinatorial Diffusion Auction Design

X Li, M Li, Y Cao, D Zhao - arxiv preprint arxiv:2410.22765, 2024 - arxiv.org
Diffusion auction design for combinatorial settings is a long-standing challenge. One
difficulty is that we cannot directly extend the solutions for simpler settings to combinatorial …

Sybil-Proof Mechanism for Information Propagation with Budgets

J Zheng, X Ge, B Li, D Zhao - … Workshop on Mechanism Design in Social …, 2024 - Springer
This research investigates the problem of reward distribution in social networks to increase
the effectiveness of crowdsourcing tasks for sponsors. Our goal is to design reward …

Connected Trading Cycles

X Song, T Yang, D Zhao - arxiv preprint arxiv:2303.09759, 2023 - arxiv.org
This paper studies one-sided matching with initial endowments and the social connections
between participants are specifically considered (their social network). Different from the …

A Summary of Distributed Mechanism Design in Social Networks

H Liu, Y Zhang - International Workshop on Mechanism Design in …, 2024 - Springer
The latest trend in auction design involves creating mechanisms that encourage buyers to
bring new participants into the auction through their social networks. This presents a unique …