Combinatorial auctions: A survey

S De Vries, RV Vohra - INFORMS Journal on computing, 2003 - pubsonline.informs.org
Many auctions involve the sale of a variety of distinct assets. Examples are airport time slots,
delivery routes, network routing, and furniture. Because of complementarities or substitution …

Electricity markets in a time of change: a call to arms for business research

M Bichler, HU Buhl, J Knörr, F Maldonado… - … Journal of Business …, 2022 - Springer
Europe's clean energy transition is imperative to combat climate change and represents an
economic opportunity to become independent of fossil fuels. As such, the energy transition …

The combinatorial assignment problem: Approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes

E Budish - Journal of Political Economy, 2011 - journals.uchicago.edu
This paper proposes a new mechanism for combinatorial assignment—for example,
assigning schedules of courses to students—based on an approximation to competitive …

Discrete convex analysis

K Murota - Mathematical Programming, 1998 - Springer
A theory of “discrete convex analysis” is developed for integer-valued functions defined on
integer lattice points. The theory parallels the ordinary convex analysis, covering discrete …

Demand reduction and inefficiency in multi-unit auctions

LM Ausubel, P Cramton, M Pycia… - The Review of …, 2014 - academic.oup.com
Auctions often involve the sale of many related goods: Treasury, spectrum, and electricity
auctions are examples. In multi-unit auctions, bids for marginal units may affect payments for …

An efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple objects

LM Ausubel - American Economic Review, 2004 - aeaweb.org
When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield
inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous …

Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes

F Gul, E Stacchetti - Journal of Economic theory, 1999 - Elsevier
We study economies with indivisibilities that satisfy the gross substitutes (GS) condition. The
simplest example of GS preferences are unit demand preferences. We prove that the set of …

Efficient market-clearing prices in markets with nonconvexities

RP O'Neill, PM Sotkiewicz, BF Hobbs… - European journal of …, 2005 - Elsevier
This paper addresses the existence of market clearing prices and the economic
interpretation of strong duality for integer programs in the economic analysis of markets with …

Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions

N Nisan - Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Electronic …, 2000 - dl.acm.org
When an auction of multiple items is performed, it is often desirable to allow bids on
combinations of items, as opposed to only on single items. Such an auction is often called" …

An efficient dynamic auction for heterogeneous commodities

LM Ausubel - American Economic Review, 2006 - aeaweb.org
This article proposes a new dynamic design for auctioning multiple heterogeneous
commodities. An auctioneer wishes to allocate K types of commodities among n bidders …