[BOOK][B] Handbook of computational social choice

F Brandt, V Conitzer, U Endriss, J Lang, AD Procaccia - 2016 - books.google.com
The rapidly growing field of computational social choice, at the intersection of computer
science and economics, deals with the computational aspects of collective decision making …

What really matters in designing school choice mechanisms

PA Pathak - Advances in Economics and Econometrics, 2017 - books.google.com
In the last decade, numerous student assignment systems have been redesigned using
input from economists in the large American cities and elsewhere. This article reviews some …

The theory and empirics of the marriage market

PA Chiappori - Annual Review of Economics, 2020 - annualreviews.org
The Theory and Empirics of the Marriage Market | Annual Reviews Menu Publications AZ
Journal Information About Subscribe Give Personal Register/Sign-in 0 Cart Help Journal …

Do parents value school effectiveness?

A Abdulkadiroğlu, PA Pathak, J Schellenberg… - American Economic …, 2020 - aeaweb.org
School choice may lead to improvements in school productivity if parents' choices reward
effective schools and punish ineffective ones. This mechanism requires parents to choose …

The combinatorial assignment problem: Approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes

E Budish - Journal of Political Economy, 2011 - journals.uchicago.edu
This paper proposes a new mechanism for combinatorial assignment—for example,
assigning schedules of courses to students—based on an approximation to competitive …

[BOOK][B] Algorithmics of matching under preferences

D Manlove - 2013 - books.google.com
Matching problems with preferences are all around us: they arise when agents seek to be
allocated to one another on the basis of ranked preferences over potential outcomes …

[BOOK][B] The diversity bargain: And other dilemmas of race, admissions, and meritocracy at elite universities

NK Warikoo - 2020 - degruyter.com
We've heard plenty from politicians and experts on affirmative action and higher education,
about how universities should intervene—if at all—to ensure a diverse but deserving student …

Matching with contracts

JW Hatfield, PR Milgrom - American Economic Review, 2005 - aeaweb.org
We develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates, as special cases, the
college admissions problem, the Kelso-Crawford labor market matching model, and …

Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets

AE Roth - Journal of Economic perspectives, 2007 - aeaweb.org
This essay examines how repugnance sometimes constrains what transactions and markets
we see. When my colleagues and I have helped design markets and allocation procedures …

The Boston public school match

A Abdulkadiroğlu, PA Pathak, AE Roth… - American Economic …, 2005 - pubs.aeaweb.org
After the publication of “School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach” by Abdulkadiroglu
and Sönmez (2003), a Boston Globe reporter contacted us about the Boston Public Schools …