This chapter surveys the literature on strategy proofness from a historical perspective. While
I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main …

Algorithmic game theory Page 1 78 communications of the acm | july 2010 | vol. 53 | no. 7 review
articles The widespread adopTioN of the Internet and the emergence of the Web changed …

The study of approximate mechanism design for facility location problems has been in the
center of research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics for the last …

The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic
versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms …

Some of the basic results and insights of the literature on mechanism design are presented.
In that literature game theoretic reasoning is used to model social institutions as varied as …

We study mechanisms for candidate selection that seek to minimize the social cost, where
voters and candidates are associated with points in some underlying metric space. The …

Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked,
single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the …

We consider the problem of locating facilities in a metric space to serve a set of selfish
agents. The cost of an agent is the distance between her own location and the nearest …

We consider K-Facility Location games, where n strategic agents report their locations in a
metric space and a mechanism maps them to K facilities. The agents seek to minimize their …

We study the implementation challenge in an abstract interdependent values model and an
arbitrary objective function. We design a generic mechanism that allows for approximate …