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Setting lower bounds on truthfulness
This paper presents inapproximability results for paradigmatic multi-dimensional truthful
mechanism design problems. We first show a lower bound of 2− 1 n for the scheduling …
mechanism design problems. We first show a lower bound of 2− 1 n for the scheduling …
A Lower Bound of 1+φ for Truthful Scheduling Mechanisms
We study the mechanism design version of the unrelated machines scheduling problem,
which is at the core of Algorithmic Game Theory and was first proposed and studied in a …
which is at the core of Algorithmic Game Theory and was first proposed and studied in a …
[PDF][PDF] Coexistence of utilitarian efficiency and false-name-proofness in social choice
The class of Groves mechanisms has been attracting much attention in mechanism design
literature due to two attractive characteristics: utilitarian efficiency (also called social welfare …
literature due to two attractive characteristics: utilitarian efficiency (also called social welfare …
[PDF][PDF] Market intermediation: information, computation, and incentives
M Gerstgrasser - 2018 - drive.google.com
Auctions are a major field of interest in game theory and in the wider microeconomics area,
reflected by recognitions such as Nobel prizes to William Vickrey and Paul Milgrom. The …
reflected by recognitions such as Nobel prizes to William Vickrey and Paul Milgrom. The …