A game-theoretic method of fair resource allocation for cloud computing services

G Wei, AV Vasilakos, Y Zheng, N **ong - The journal of supercomputing, 2010 - Springer
As cloud-based services become more numerous and dynamic, resource provisioning
becomes more and more challenging. A QoS constrained resource allocation problem is …

Approximate mechanism design without money

AD Procaccia, M Tennenholtz - ACM Transactions on Economics and …, 2013 - dl.acm.org
The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic
versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms …

Asymptotically optimal strategy-proof mechanisms for two-facility games

P Lu, X Sun, Y Wang, ZA Zhu - Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference …, 2010 - dl.acm.org
We consider the problem of locating facilities in a metric space to serve a set of selfish
agents. The cost of an agent is the distance between her own location and the nearest …

[HTML][HTML] A novel agent based autonomous and service composition framework for cost optimization of resource provisioning in cloud computing

A Singh, D Juneja, M Malhotra - Journal of King Saud University-Computer …, 2017 - Elsevier
A cloud computing environment offers a simplified, centralized platform or resources for use
when needed at a low cost. One of the key functionalities of this type of computing is to …

Mechanism design with predictions

C Xu, P Lu - arxiv preprint arxiv:2205.11313, 2022 - arxiv.org
Improving algorithms via predictions is a very active research topic in recent years. This
paper initiates the systematic study of mechanism design in this model. In a number of well …

On the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms

N Chen, N Gravin, P Lu - Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM …, 2011 - SIAM
Budget feasible mechanisms, recently initiated by Singer (FOCS 2010), extend algorithmic
mechanism design problems to a realistic setting with a budget constraint. We consider the …

Strategyproof scheduling with predictions

E Balkanski, V Gkatzelis, X Tan - arxiv preprint arxiv:2209.04058, 2022 - arxiv.org
In their seminal paper that initiated the field of algorithmic mechanism design,\citet {NR99}
studied the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for scheduling jobs on …

Understanding incentives: Mechanism design becomes algorithm design

Y Cai, C Daskalakis… - 2013 IEEE 54th Annual …, 2013 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
We provide a computationally efficient black-box reduction from mechanism design to
algorithm design in very general settings. Specifically, we give an approximation-preserving …

Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity

R Lavi, C Swamy - Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic …, 2007 - dl.acm.org
We consider the problem of makespan minimization on m unrelated machines in the context
of algorithmic mechanism design, where the machines are the strategic players. This is a …

Mechanism design for machine scheduling problems: Classification and literature overview

D Kress, S Meiswinkel, E Pesch - OR Spectrum, 2018 - Springer
This paper provides a literature overview on (direct revelation) algorithmic mechanism
design in the context of machine scheduling problems. Here, one takes a game-theoretic …