A game-theoretic method of fair resource allocation for cloud computing services
As cloud-based services become more numerous and dynamic, resource provisioning
becomes more and more challenging. A QoS constrained resource allocation problem is …
becomes more and more challenging. A QoS constrained resource allocation problem is …
Approximate mechanism design without money
The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic
versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms …
versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms …
Asymptotically optimal strategy-proof mechanisms for two-facility games
We consider the problem of locating facilities in a metric space to serve a set of selfish
agents. The cost of an agent is the distance between her own location and the nearest …
agents. The cost of an agent is the distance between her own location and the nearest …
[HTML][HTML] A novel agent based autonomous and service composition framework for cost optimization of resource provisioning in cloud computing
A cloud computing environment offers a simplified, centralized platform or resources for use
when needed at a low cost. One of the key functionalities of this type of computing is to …
when needed at a low cost. One of the key functionalities of this type of computing is to …
Mechanism design with predictions
Improving algorithms via predictions is a very active research topic in recent years. This
paper initiates the systematic study of mechanism design in this model. In a number of well …
paper initiates the systematic study of mechanism design in this model. In a number of well …
On the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms
Budget feasible mechanisms, recently initiated by Singer (FOCS 2010), extend algorithmic
mechanism design problems to a realistic setting with a budget constraint. We consider the …
mechanism design problems to a realistic setting with a budget constraint. We consider the …
Strategyproof scheduling with predictions
In their seminal paper that initiated the field of algorithmic mechanism design,\citet {NR99}
studied the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for scheduling jobs on …
studied the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for scheduling jobs on …
Understanding incentives: Mechanism design becomes algorithm design
We provide a computationally efficient black-box reduction from mechanism design to
algorithm design in very general settings. Specifically, we give an approximation-preserving …
algorithm design in very general settings. Specifically, we give an approximation-preserving …
Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
R Lavi, C Swamy - Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic …, 2007 - dl.acm.org
We consider the problem of makespan minimization on m unrelated machines in the context
of algorithmic mechanism design, where the machines are the strategic players. This is a …
of algorithmic mechanism design, where the machines are the strategic players. This is a …
Mechanism design for machine scheduling problems: Classification and literature overview
This paper provides a literature overview on (direct revelation) algorithmic mechanism
design in the context of machine scheduling problems. Here, one takes a game-theoretic …
design in the context of machine scheduling problems. Here, one takes a game-theoretic …