We survey the experimental literature on communication of private information via cheap-
talk messages. The focus is on work that is firmly grounded in theory. We discuss the …

Purpose Signals, eg information released by firms about new products attract the attention
and scrutiny of customers, competitors and other stakeholders. In product management, an …

Work performance is often difficult to assess thus leaving room for manipulation of commonly-
used metrics. We created a laboratory workplace in which we can precisely assess both …

Potato late blight remains a threat to food security and livelihood of millions of people in
Ethiopia. Despite a rapid dispersal of the disease pathogen and farmers' interdependency in …

Penelitian ini mengevaluasi keputusan yang diambil oleh pemerintah Kota Surabaya dalam
mengimplementasikan program pasar murah dengan tujuan menjaga stabilitas harga …

We experimentally study information transmission by experts motivated by their reputation
for being well-informed. In our game of reputational cheap talk, a reporter privately observes …

We use laboratory experiments to study communication games with partially verifiable
information. In these games, based on Glazer and Rubinstein, 2004, Glazer and Rubinstein …

This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap-talk information.
We find that the level of trade in these markets is very small and eventually vanishes. Sellers …

We consider an experiment with a version of the Battle of the Sexes game with two-sided
private information, preceded by a round of either one-way or two-way cheap talk. We …