This review summarizes a nascent body of theoretical research on design of incentives
when the environment is not fully known to the designer and offers some general lessons …

This paper proposes a new mechanism for combinatorial assignment—for example,
assigning schedules of courses to students—based on an approximation to competitive …

This is a survey of progress with the postcrisis global (G20) reform of the financial system, in
five key areas of new regulation:(1) making financial institutions more resilient;(2) ending …

A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The cost of
each seller is random, with common and private value components, and the seller receives …

A number of labor markets and student placement systems can be modeled as many-to-one
matching markets. We analyze the scope for manipulation in many-to-one matching markets …

We propose a criterion of approximate incentive compatibility, strategy-proofness in the
large (SP-L), and argue that it is a useful second-best to exact strategy-proofness (SP) for …

This survey outlines a general and modular theory for proving approximation guarantees for
equilibria of auctions in complex settings. This theory complements traditional economic …

A step toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium is taken by
considering a double auction with n buyers and m sellers with interdependent values and …

The random priority (random serial dictatorship) mechanism is a common method for
assigning objects. The mechanism is easy to implement and strategy‐proof. However, this …

We study a multi-unit auction environment similar to eBay. Sellers, each with a single unit of
a homogeneous good, set reserve prices at their own second-price auctions. Each buyer …