Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling

I Arieli, Y Babichenko, R Smorodinsky… - Theoretical …, 2023‏ - Wiley Online Library
Mean‐preserving contractions are critical for studying Bayesian models of information
design. We introduce the class of bi‐pooling policies, and the class of bi‐pooling …

Screening with persuasion

D Bergemann, T Heumann, S Morris - arxiv preprint arxiv:2212.03360, 2022‏ - arxiv.org
We consider a general nonlinear pricing environment with private information. The seller
can control both the signal that the buyers receive about their value and the selling …

The persuasion duality

P Dworczak, A Kolotilin - Theoretical Economics, 2024‏ - Wiley Online Library
We present a unified duality approach to Bayesian persuasion. The optimal dual variable,
interpreted as a price function on the state space, is shown to be a supergradient of the …

Persuasion in networks: Public signals and k-cores

O Candogan - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on …, 2019‏ - dl.acm.org
We consider a setting where agents in a social network take binary actions, which exhibit
local strategic complementarities. In particular, the payoff of each agent depends on the …

Monotone function intervals: Theory and applications

KH Yang, AK Zentefis - American Economic Review, 2024‏ - aeaweb.org
A monotone function interval is the set of monotone functions that lie pointwise between two
fixed,-monotone functions. We characterize the set of extreme points of monotone function …

Dynamic pricing and learning with bayesian persuasion

S Agrawal, Y Feng, W Tang - Advances in Neural …, 2023‏ - proceedings.neurips.cc
We consider a novel dynamic pricing and learning setting where in addition to setting prices
of products in sequential rounds, the seller also ex-ante commits to 'advertising schemes' …

Strategic release of information in platforms: Entry, competition, and welfare

K Bimpikis, G Mantegazza - Operations Research, 2023‏ - pubsonline.informs.org
Two-sided platforms play an important role in reducing frictions and facilitating trade, and in
doing so they increasingly engage in collecting and processing data about supply and …

Constrained information design

L Doval, V Skreta - Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024‏ - pubsonline.informs.org
We provide tools to analyze information design problems subject to constraints. We do so by
extending an insight by Le Treust and Tomala to the case of multiple inequality and equality …

Persuasion meets delegation

A Kolotilin, A Zapechelnyuk - Econometrica, 2025‏ - Wiley Online Library
A principal can restrict an agent's information (the persuasion problem) or discretion (the
delegation problem). We study these two problems under standard single‐crossing …

Beckmann's approach to multi-item multi-bidder auctions

AV Kolesnikov, F Sandomirskiy, A Tsyvinski… - arxiv preprint arxiv …, 2022‏ - arxiv.org
We consider the problem of revenue-maximizing Bayesian auction design with several
bidders having independent private values over several items. We show that it can be …