The classic prophet inequality states that, when faced with a finite sequence of non-negative
independent random variables, a gambler who knows their distribution and is allowed to …

Matching, capturing allocation of items to unit-demand buyers, or tasks to workers, or pairs of
collaborators, is a central problem in economics. Indeed, the growing prevalence of …

We introduce the abstract problem of rounding an unknown fractional bipartite b-matching x
revealed online (eg, output by an online fractional algorithm), exposed node-by-node on …

We study a natural combinatorial single-principal multi-agent contract design problem, in
which a principal motivates a team of agents to exert effort toward a given task. At the heart …

We consider a logit model-based framework for modeling joint pricing and assortment
decisions that take into account customer features. This model provides a significant …

The secretary and the prophet inequality problems are central to the field of Stop**
Theory. Recently, there has been a lot of work in generalizing these models to multiple items …

In online combinatorial auctions m indivisible items are to be allocated to n agents who
arrive online. Agents have random valuations for the different subsets of items and the goal …

We consider the classic principal-agent model of contract theory, in which a principal
designs an outcome-dependent compensation scheme to incentivize an agent to take a …

In the classic prophet inequality, a well-known problem in optimal stop** theory, samples
from independent random variables (possibly differently distributed) arrive online. A gambler …

Motivated by the success of using black-box predictive algorithms as subroutines for online
decision-making, we develop a new framework for designing online policies given access to …