Truth, justice, and cake cutting

Y Chen, JK Lai, DC Parkes, AD Procaccia - Games and Economic Behavior, 2013 - Elsevier
Cake cutting is a common metaphor for the division of a heterogeneous divisible good.
There are numerous papers that study the problem of fairly dividing a cake; a small number …

[PDF][PDF] Cake cutting algorithms

AD Procaccia - 2016 - kilthub.cmu.edu
Imagine a cake that must be divided between a group of gluttonous children. To complicate
matters, the cake is heterogeneous: two pieces of cake may differ in terms of their top**s …

Cake cutting: Not just child's play

AD Procaccia - Communications of the ACM, 2013 - dl.acm.org
Cake cutting Page 1 78 CommuniCations of thE aCm | july 2013 | vol. 56 | no. 7 contributed
articles addressing some of the great challenges of the 21st century involves a thorough …

Almost full EFX exists for four agents

B Berger, A Cohen, M Feldman, A Fiat - Proceedings of the AAAI …, 2022 - ojs.aaai.org
The existence of EFX allocations of goods is a major open problem in fair division, even for
additive valuations. The current state of the art is that no setting where EFX allocations are …

Optimal envy-free cake cutting

Y Cohler, J Lai, D Parkes, A Procaccia - Proceedings of the AAAI …, 2011 - ojs.aaai.org
We consider the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous divisible good among agents
with different preferences. Previous work has shown that envy-free allocations, ie, where …

Mechanism design for fair division: allocating divisible items without payments

R Cole, V Gkatzelis, G Goel - … of the fourteenth ACM conference on …, 2013 - dl.acm.org
We revisit the classic problem of fair division from a mechanism design perspective and
provide an elegant truthful mechanism that yields surprisingly good approximation …

On existence of truthful fair cake cutting mechanisms

B Tao - Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on …, 2022 - dl.acm.org
We study the fair division problem on divisible heterogeneous resources (the cake cutting
problem) with strategic agents, where each agent can manipulate his/her private valuation in …

Truthful fair mechanisms for allocating mixed divisible and indivisible goods

Z Li, S Liu, X Lu, B Tao - arxiv preprint arxiv:2305.09206, 2023 - arxiv.org
We study the problem of designing truthful and fair mechanisms when allocating a mixture of
divisible and indivisible goods. We first show that there does not exist an EFM (envy-free for …

On best-of-both-worlds fair-share allocations

M Babaioff, T Ezra, U Feige - … Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 2022 - Springer
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible items among n agents with additive
valuations, when agents have equal entitlements to the goods, and there are no transfers …

Envy-free cake-cutting for four agents

A Hollender, A Rubinstein - 2023 IEEE 64th Annual Symposium …, 2023 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
In the envy-free cake-cutting problem we are given a resource, usually called a cake and
represented as the 0,1 interval, and a set of n agents with heterogeneous preferences over …