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Optimal auctions through deep learning: Advances in differentiable economics
Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is an intricate
task. The single-item case was resolved in a seminal piece of work by Myerson in 1981, but …
task. The single-item case was resolved in a seminal piece of work by Myerson in 1981, but …
A duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design
We provide a unified view of many recent developments in Bayesian mechanism design,
including the black-box reductions of Cai et. al., simple auctions for additive buyers, and …
including the black-box reductions of Cai et. al., simple auctions for additive buyers, and …
Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality
We provide simple and approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms in the multi-item multi-
bidder settings. We unify and improve all previous results, as well as generalize the results …
bidder settings. We unify and improve all previous results, as well as generalize the results …
Simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity
We study the revenue maximization problem of a seller with n heterogeneous items for sale
to a single buyer whose valuation function for sets of items is unknown and drawn from …
to a single buyer whose valuation function for sets of items is unknown and drawn from …
[PDF][PDF] Deep learning for revenue-optimal auctions with budgets
The design of revenue-maximizing auctions for settings with private budgets is a hard task.
Even the single-item case is not fully understood, and there are no analytical results for …
Even the single-item case is not fully understood, and there are no analytical results for …
Contracts with private cost per unit-of-effort
Economic theory distinguishes between principal-agent settings in which the agent has a
private type and settings in which the agent takes a hidden action. Many practical problems …
private type and settings in which the agent takes a hidden action. Many practical problems …