A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction
of truthful mechanisms called VCG (Vickrey, Clarke, Groves). When applying this method to …

A fundamental problem in building open distributed systems is to design mechanisms that
compute optimal system-wide solutions despite the self-interest of individual users and …

Generalized Vickrey mechanisms have received wide attention in the literature because
they are efficient and strategy-proof, ie truthful bidding is optimal whatever the bids of other …

We propose a new approach for understanding the algorithm-specific empirical hardness of-
Hard problems. In this work we focus on the empirical hardness of the winner determination …

We present a novel algorithm for computing the optimal winning bids in a combinatorial
auction (CA), that is, an auction in which bidders bid for bundles of goods. All previously …

The resource scheduling problem in a multi-project environment extends job-shop
scheduling problems by allowing for task dependency and multiple self-interested entities. In …

This paper analyzes ex post equilibria in the VCG combinatorial auctions. If Σ is a family of
bundles of goods, the organizer may restrict the bundles on which the participants submit …

The allocation of discrete, complementary resources is a fundamental problem in economics
and of direct interest to e-commerce applications. Combinatorial auctions account for …

A simple characterization of the equilibrium conditions required to compute Vickrey
payments in the Combinatorial Allocation Problem leads to an ascending price Generalized …

Auctions are the most widely used strategic game-theoretic mechanisms in the Internet.
Auctions have been mostly studied from a game-theoretic and economic perspective …