We exhibit three approximation algorithms for the allocation problem in combinatorial
auctions with complement free bidders. The running time of these algorithms is polynomial …

In combinatorial auctions, a large number of items are auctioned concurrently and bidders
are allowed to express preferences on bundles of items. This is preferable to selling each …

We explore the allocation problem in combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. We
provide an e/e-1 approximation algorithm for this problem. Moreover, our algorithm applies …

We study the following Bayesian setting: m items are sold to n selfish bidders in m
independent second-price auctions. Each bidder has a private valuation function that …

We design two computationally-efficient incentive-compatible mechanisms for combinatorial
auctions with general bidder preferences. Both mechanisms are randomized, and are …

We provide tight information-theoretic lower bounds for the welfare maximization problem in
combinatorial auctions. In this problem, the goal is to partition m items among k bidders in a …

This paper discusses two advancements in the theory of designing truthful randomized
mechanisms. Our first contribution is a new framework for develo** truthful randomized …

We study the following simple Bayesian auction setting: m items are sold to n selfish bidders
in m independent second-price auctions. Each bidder has a private valuation function that …

We study the computational power of iterative combinatorial auctions. Most existing iterative
combinatorial auctions are based on repeatedly suggesting prices for bundles of items and …

Congestion games are non-cooperative games where the utility of a player from using a
certain resource depends on the total number of players that are using the same resource …