Introduction to multi-armed bandits

A Slivkins - Foundations and Trends® in Machine Learning, 2019 - nowpublishers.com
Multi-armed bandits a simple but very powerful framework for algorithms that make
decisions over time under uncertainty. An enormous body of work has accumulated over the …

Learning in repeated auctions with budgets: Regret minimization and equilibrium

SR Balseiro, Y Gur - Management Science, 2019 - pubsonline.informs.org
In online advertising markets, advertisers often purchase ad placements through bidding in
repeated auctions based on realized viewer information. We study how budget-constrained …

Algorithmic bidding for virtual trading in electricity markets

S Baltaoglu, L Tong, Q Zhao - IEEE Transactions on Power …, 2018 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
We consider the problem of optimal bidding for virtual trading in two-settlement electricity
markets. A virtual trader aims to arbitrage on differences between day-ahead and real-time …

Distribution-free contextual dynamic pricing

Y Luo, WW Sun, Y Liu - Mathematics of Operations …, 2024 - pubsonline.informs.org
Contextual dynamic pricing aims to set personalized prices based on sequential interactions
with customers. At each time period, a customer who is interested in purchasing a product …

Online Bidding Algorithms for Return-on-Spend Constrained Advertisers✱

Z Feng, S Padmanabhan, D Wang - … of the ACM Web Conference 2023, 2023 - dl.acm.org
We study online auto-bidding algorithms for a single advertiser maximizing value under the
Return-on-Spend (RoS) constraint, quantifying performance in terms of regret relative to the …

[PDF][PDF] Bidding and pricing in budget and roi constrained markets

N Golrezaei, P Jaillet, JCN Liang, V Mirrokni - arxiv preprint arxiv …, 2021 - mit.edu
In online advertising markets, setting budget and return on investment (ROI) constraints are
two prevalent ways to help advertisers (ie buyers) utilize limited monetary resources …

[PDF][PDF] No-regret learning in bilateral trade via global budget balance

M Bernasconi, M Castiglioni, A Celli… - Proceedings of the 56th …, 2024 - dl.acm.org
Bilateral trade models the problem of intermediating between two rational agents—a seller
and a buyer—both characterized by a private valuation for an item they want to trade. We …

Learning to bid optimally and efficiently in adversarial first-price auctions

Y Han, Z Zhou, A Flores, E Ordentlich… - arxiv preprint arxiv …, 2020 - arxiv.org
First-price auctions have very recently swept the online advertising industry, replacing
second-price auctions as the predominant auction mechanism on many platforms. This shift …

Optimal no-regret learning in repeated first-price auctions

Y Han, Z Zhou, T Weissman - arxiv preprint arxiv:2003.09795, 2020 - arxiv.org
We study online learning in repeated first-price auctions where a bidder, only observing the
winning bid at the end of each auction, learns to adaptively bid in order to maximize her …

Dispersion for data-driven algorithm design, online learning, and private optimization

MF Balcan, T Dick, E Vitercik - 2018 IEEE 59th Annual …, 2018 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
A crucial problem in modern data science is data-driven algorithm design, where the goal is
to choose the best algorithm, or algorithm parameters, for a specific application domain. In …