We study a robust selling problem where a seller attempts to sell one item to a buyer but is
uncertain about the buyer's valuation distribution. The existing literature shows that robust …

Problem definition: We study a data-driven pricing problem in which a seller offers a price for
a single item based on demand observed at a small number of historical prices. Our goal is …

Robust mechanism design is a rising alternative to Bayesian mechanism design, which
yields designs that do not rely on assumptions like full distributional knowledge. We apply …

We obtain distribution-free bounds for various fundamental quantities used in probability
theory by solving optimization problems that search for extreme distributions among all …

We consider a monopoly pricing problem, where a seller has multiple items to sell to a
single buyer, only knowing the distribution of the buyer's value profile. The seller's goal is to …

We consider the mechanism design problem of a principal allocating a single good to one of
several agents without monetary transfers. Each agent desires the good and uses it to create …

This study investigates a seller's revenue-maximizing pricing decision when faced with a
representative customer capable of direct purchase or purchase following a costly search …

It is generally challenging to characterize the optimal selling mechanism even when the
seller knows the buyer's valuation distributions in multi-item screening. An insightful and …

We investigate the implications and interplay of emergency supply and responsive pricing—
two effective strategies to mitigate supply risk—in response to yield randomness with limited …

Traditional monopoly pricing assumes sellers have full information about consumer
valuations. We consider monopoly pricing under limited information, where a seller only …