Participatory budgeting: Models and approaches

H Aziz, N Shah - Pathways Between Social Science and Computational …, 2021 - Springer
Participatory budgeting is a democratic approach to deciding the funding of public projects,
which has been adopted in many cities across the world. We present a survey of research …

The (computational) social choice take on indivisible participatory budgeting

S Rey, J Maly - arxiv preprint arxiv:2303.00621, 2023 - arxiv.org
In this survey, we review the literature investigating participatory budgeting as a social
choice problem. Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a democratic process in which citizens are …

Optimized distortion and proportional fairness in voting

S Ebadian, A Kahng, D Peters, N Shah - ACM Transactions on …, 2024 - dl.acm.org
A voting rule decides on a probability distribution over a set of m alternatives, based on
rankings of those alternatives provided by agents. We assume that agents have cardinal …

Proportional aggregation of preferences for sequential decision making

N Chandak, S Goel, D Peters - Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on …, 2024 - ojs.aaai.org
We study the problem of fair sequential decision making given voter preferences. In each
round, a decision rule must choose a decision from a set of alternatives where each voter …

Fair mixing: the case of dichotomous preferences

H Aziz, A Bogomolnaia, H Moulin - … of the 2019 ACM Conference on …, 2019 - dl.acm.org
We consider a setting in which agents vote to choose a fair mixture of public outcomes. The
agents have dichotomous preferences: each outcome is liked or disliked by an agent. We …

Truthful aggregation of budget proposals

R Freeman, DM Pennock, D Peters… - Proceedings of the …, 2019 - dl.acm.org
We study a participatory budgeting setting in which a single divisible resource (such as
money or time) must be divided among a set of projects. For example, participatory …

Approximately stable committee selection

Z Jiang, K Munagala, K Wang - Proceedings of the 52nd Annual ACM …, 2020 - dl.acm.org
In the committee selection problem, we are given m candidates, and n voters. Candidates
can have different weights. A committee is a subset of candidates, and its weight is the sum …

Proportionally representative participatory budgeting with ordinal preferences

H Aziz, BE Lee - Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial …, 2021 - ojs.aaai.org
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic paradigm whereby voters decide on a set of
projects to fund with a limited budget. We consider PB in a setting where voters report …

Settling the score: Portioning with cardinal preferences

E Elkind, W Suksompong, N Teh - ECAI 2023, 2023 - ebooks.iospress.nl
We study a portioning setting in which a public resource such as time or money is to be
divided among a given set of candidates, and each agent proposes a division of the …

[PDF][PDF] Developments in multi-agent fair allocation

H Aziz - Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial …, 2020 - aaai.org
Developments in Multi-Agent Fair Allocation Page 1 The Thirty-Fourth AAAI Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-20) Developments in Multi-Agent Fair Allocation Haris Aziz UNSW …