Centralized exchanges vs. decentralized exchanges in cryptocurrency markets: A systematic literature review

S Hägele - Electronic Markets, 2024 - Springer
Research on cryptocurrency exchanges, consisting of both centralized exchanges (CEXs)
and decentralized exchanges (DEXs), has seen a significant increase in contributions in …

Demystifying defi mev activities in flashbots bundle

Z Li, J Li, Z He, X Luo, T Wang, X Ni, W Yang… - Proceedings of the …, 2023 - dl.acm.org
Decentralized Finance, mushrooming in permissionless blockchains, has attracted a recent
surge in popularity. Due to the transparency of permissionless blockchains, opportunistic …

Impact and user perception of sandwich attacks in the defi ecosystem

Y Wang, P Zuest, Y Yao, Z Lu… - Proceedings of the 2022 …, 2022 - dl.acm.org
Decentralized finance (DeFi) enables crypto-asset holders to conduct complex financial
transactions, while maintaining control over their assets in the blockchain ecosystem …

A theory of automated market makers in DeFi

M Bartoletti, JH Chiang… - Logical Methods in …, 2022 - lmcs.episciences.org
Automated market makers (AMMs) are one of the most prominent decentralized finance
(DeFi) applications. AMMs allow users to trade different types of crypto-tokens, without the …

A large scale study of the ethereum arbitrage ecosystem

R McLaughlin, C Kruegel, G Vigna - 32nd USENIX Security Symposium …, 2023 - usenix.org
The Ethereum blockchain rapidly became the epicenter of a complex financial ecosystem,
powered by decentralized exchanges (DEXs). These exchanges form a diverse capital …

Towards a theory of maximal extractable value i: Constant function market makers

K Kulkarni, T Diamandis, T Chitra - arxiv preprint arxiv:2207.11835, 2022 - arxiv.org
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) refers to excess value captured by miners (or validators)
from users in a cryptocurrency network. This excess value often comes from reordering …

Lanturn: Measuring economic security of smart contracts through adaptive learning

K Babel, M Javaheripi, Y Ji, M Kelkar… - Proceedings of the …, 2023 - dl.acm.org
We introduce Lanturn: a general purpose adaptive learning-based framework for measuring
the cryptoeconomic security of composed decentralized-finance (DeFi) smart contracts …

Sok: Mitigation of front-running in decentralized finance

C Baum, J Hsin-yu Chiang, B David… - … Conference on Financial …, 2022 - Springer
Front-running is the malicious, and often illegal, act of both manipulating the order of
pending trades and injecting additional trades to make a profit at the cost of other users. In …

Transaction fee mechanism design with active block producers

M Bahrani, P Garimidi, T Roughgarden - International Conference on …, 2024 - Springer
The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been
investigated with passive block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards …

Fairblock: Preventing blockchain front-running with minimal overheads

P Momeni, S Gorbunov, B Zhang - … Conference on Security and Privacy in …, 2022 - Springer
While blockchain systems are quickly gaining popularity, front-running remains a major
obstacle to fair exchange. In this paper, we show how to apply identity-based encryption …