This article reviews recent developments in the theory of committee decision‐making. A
committee consists of self‐interested members who make a public decision by aggregating …

Organizations exist largely to get things done. Determining what should be done, by whom,
how, when, and where (and then actually getting it done) requires decisions, and making …

A principal can restrict an agent's information (the persuasion problem) or restrict an agent's
discretion (the delegation problem). We show that these problems are generally equivalent …

We study optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents when performance is evaluated by
a reviewer. The reviewer may be biased in favor of the agents, but the degree of bias is …

The paper extends the optimal delegation framework to a dynamic environment where the
agent initially has private information merely about the distribution of the state and learns the …

This article studies a principal-agent problem where the only commitment for the uninformed
principal is to restrict the set of decisions she makes following a report by the informed …

This paper compares the relative performance of different organizational structures for the
decision of accepting or rejecting a project of uncertain quality. When the principal is …

We consider a principal's choice between either controlling an agent's action through an
incomplete contract or guiding him through non-binding communication. The principal …

We study the strategic provision of expert advice in a variation of the classic senderreceiver
game in which the environment is complex, so knowledge of the sender's preferred action …

Decision making in practice is often difficult, with many actions to choose from and much that
is unknown. Experts play a particularly important role in such complex environments. We …