Learning in games: a systematic review
RJ Qin, Y Yu - Science China Information Sciences, 2024 - Springer
Game theory studies the mathematical models for self-interested individuals. Nash
equilibrium is arguably the most central solution in game theory. While finding the Nash …
equilibrium is arguably the most central solution in game theory. While finding the Nash …
On the last-iterate convergence in time-varying zero-sum games: Extra gradient succeeds where optimism fails
Last-iterate convergence has received extensive study in two player zero-sum games
starting from bilinear, convex-concave up to settings that satisfy the MVI condition. Typical …
starting from bilinear, convex-concave up to settings that satisfy the MVI condition. Typical …
Doubly optimal no-regret learning in monotone games
We consider online learning in multi-player smooth monotone games. Existing algorithms
have limitations such as (1) being only applicable to strongly monotone games;(2) lacking …
have limitations such as (1) being only applicable to strongly monotone games;(2) lacking …
Strategic behavior and no-regret learning in queueing systems
This paper studies a dynamic discrete-time queuing model where at every period players
get a new job and must send all their jobs to a queue that has a limited capacity. Players …
get a new job and must send all their jobs to a queue that has a limited capacity. Players …
Synchronization behind Learning in Periodic Zero-Sum Games Triggers Divergence from Nash equilibrium
Learning in zero-sum games studies a situation where multiple agents competitively learn
their strategy. In such multi-agent learning, we often see that the strategies cycle around …
their strategy. In such multi-agent learning, we often see that the strategies cycle around …
Regret minimization in stackelberg games with side information
In its most basic form, a Stackelberg game is a two-player game in which a leader commits
to a (mixed) strategy, and a follower best-responds. Stackelberg games are perhaps one of …
to a (mixed) strategy, and a follower best-responds. Stackelberg games are perhaps one of …
Gradient dynamics in linear quadratic network games with time-varying connectivity and population fluctuation
In this paper, we consider a learning problem among non-cooperative agents interacting in
a time-varying system. Specifically, we focus on repeated linear quadratic network games, in …
a time-varying system. Specifically, we focus on repeated linear quadratic network games, in …
Online Optimization Algorithms in Repeated Price Competition: Equilibrium Learning and Algorithmic Collusion
This paper addresses the question of whether or not uncoupled online learning algorithms
converge to the Nash equilibrium in pricing competition or whether they can learn to collude …
converge to the Nash equilibrium in pricing competition or whether they can learn to collude …
Last-iterate Convergence Separation between Extra-gradient and Optimism in Constrained Periodic Games
Last-iterate behaviors of learning algorithms in repeated two-player zero-sum games have
been extensively studied due to their wide applications in machine learning and related …
been extensively studied due to their wide applications in machine learning and related …
Learning in Time-Varying Monotone Network Games with Dynamic Populations
In this paper, we present a framework for multi-agent learning in a nonstationary dynamic
network environment. More specifically, we examine projected gradient play in smooth …
network environment. More specifically, we examine projected gradient play in smooth …