Learning in games: a systematic review

RJ Qin, Y Yu - Science China Information Sciences, 2024 - Springer
Game theory studies the mathematical models for self-interested individuals. Nash
equilibrium is arguably the most central solution in game theory. While finding the Nash …

On the last-iterate convergence in time-varying zero-sum games: Extra gradient succeeds where optimism fails

Y Feng, H Fu, Q Hu, P Li… - Advances in Neural …, 2024 - proceedings.neurips.cc
Last-iterate convergence has received extensive study in two player zero-sum games
starting from bilinear, convex-concave up to settings that satisfy the MVI condition. Typical …

Doubly optimal no-regret learning in monotone games

Y Cai, W Zheng - International Conference on Machine …, 2023 - proceedings.mlr.press
We consider online learning in multi-player smooth monotone games. Existing algorithms
have limitations such as (1) being only applicable to strongly monotone games;(2) lacking …

Strategic behavior and no-regret learning in queueing systems

L Baudin, M Scarsini, X Venel - arxiv preprint arxiv:2302.03614, 2023 - arxiv.org
This paper studies a dynamic discrete-time queuing model where at every period players
get a new job and must send all their jobs to a queue that has a limited capacity. Players …

Synchronization behind Learning in Periodic Zero-Sum Games Triggers Divergence from Nash equilibrium

Y Fujimoto, K Ariu, K Abe - arxiv preprint arxiv:2408.10595, 2024 - arxiv.org
Learning in zero-sum games studies a situation where multiple agents competitively learn
their strategy. In such multi-agent learning, we often see that the strategies cycle around …

Regret minimization in stackelberg games with side information

K Harris, ZS Wu, MF Balcan - arxiv preprint arxiv:2402.08576, 2024 - arxiv.org
In its most basic form, a Stackelberg game is a two-player game in which a leader commits
to a (mixed) strategy, and a follower best-responds. Stackelberg games are perhaps one of …

Gradient dynamics in linear quadratic network games with time-varying connectivity and population fluctuation

F Al Taha, K Rokade, F Parise - 2023 62nd IEEE Conference …, 2023 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
In this paper, we consider a learning problem among non-cooperative agents interacting in
a time-varying system. Specifically, we focus on repeated linear quadratic network games, in …

Online Optimization Algorithms in Repeated Price Competition: Equilibrium Learning and Algorithmic Collusion

M Bichler, J Durmann, M Oberlechner - arxiv preprint arxiv:2412.15707, 2024 - arxiv.org
This paper addresses the question of whether or not uncoupled online learning algorithms
converge to the Nash equilibrium in pricing competition or whether they can learn to collude …

Last-iterate Convergence Separation between Extra-gradient and Optimism in Constrained Periodic Games

Y Feng, P Li, I Panageas, X Wang - arxiv preprint arxiv:2406.10605, 2024 - arxiv.org
Last-iterate behaviors of learning algorithms in repeated two-player zero-sum games have
been extensively studied due to their wide applications in machine learning and related …

Learning in Time-Varying Monotone Network Games with Dynamic Populations

FA Taha, K Rokade, F Parise - arxiv preprint arxiv:2408.06253, 2024 - arxiv.org
In this paper, we present a framework for multi-agent learning in a nonstationary dynamic
network environment. More specifically, we examine projected gradient play in smooth …