Future cities promise to be more autonomous than ever, largely owing to our ability of
coordinating complex systems in real time: fleets of self-driving cars will offer on-demand …

The price of anarchy, defined as the ratio of the worst-case objective function value of a
Nash equilibrium of a game and that of an optimal outcome, quantifies the inefficiency of …

Sponsored search has been proven to be a successful business model, and sponsored
search auctions have become a hot research direction. There have been many exciting …

We initiate the study of efficient mechanism design with guaranteed good properties even
when players participate in multiple mechanisms simultaneously or sequentially. We define …

We analyze the price of anarchy (POA) in a simple and practical non-truthful combinatorial
auction when players have subadditive valuations for goods. We study the mechanism that …

Simultaneous item auctions are simple and practical procedures for allocating items to
bidders with potentially complex preferences. In a simultaneous auction, every bidder …

We develop a Bayes-Nash analysis of the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction. First,
we characterize the efficient Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the GSP when such an equilibrium …

We define smooth games of incomplete information. We prove an" extension theorem" for
such games: price of anarchy bounds for pure Nash equilibria for all induced full-information …

Abstract The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction is the primary auction used for
monetizing the use of the Internet. It is well-known that truthtelling is not a dominant strategy …

We study mechanisms for utilitarian combinatorial allocation problems, where agents are not
assumed to be single-minded. This class of problems includes combinatorial auctions, multi …