This paper presents a model of an order-driven market where fully strategic, symmetrically
informed liquidity traders dynamically choose between limit and market orders, trading off …

This paper examines moral hazard in teams over time. Agents are collectively engaged in a
project whose duration and outcome are uncertain, and their individual efforts are …

We study prisoners' dilemmas played in continuous time with flow payoffs accumulated over
60 seconds. In most cases, the median rate of mutual cooperation is about 90 percent …

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent who undertakes experiments and a
principal who provides the requisite funding. A dynamic agency cost arises—the more …

By mixing concepts from both game theoretic analysis and real options theory, an
investment decision in a competitive market can be seen as a “game” between firms, as …

We analyse a two-player game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits. Either
player has to decide in continuous time whether to use a safe arm with a known pay-off or a …

We study social dilemmas in (quasi‐) continuous‐time experiments, comparing games with
different durations and termination rules. We discover a stark qualitative contrast in behavior …

This paper analyzes automated distributive negotiation where agents have firm deadlines
that are private information. The agents are allowed to make and accept offers in any order …

I study a dynamic problem in which a group of agents collaborate over time to complete a
project. The project progresses at a rate that depends on the agents' efforts, and it generates …

This paper proposes a dynamic model of an order driven market with asymmetric
information and stochastic fundamental value. In equilibrium, informed traders submit market …