The effect of demand variability on the adoption and design of a third party's pricing algorithm
JE Harrington Jr - Economics Letters, 2024 - Elsevier
Consider a data analytics company supplying a pricing algorithm that adjusts price to a
changing demand state. For this setting, I show the pricing algorithm is designed and priced …
changing demand state. For this setting, I show the pricing algorithm is designed and priced …
Learning Collusion in Episodic, Inventory-Constrained Markets
Pricing algorithms have demonstrated the capability to learn tacit collusion that is largely
unaddressed by current regulations. Their increasing use in markets, including oligopolistic …
unaddressed by current regulations. Their increasing use in markets, including oligopolistic …
Regulation of Algorithmic Collusion, Refined: Testing Pessimistic Calibrated Regret
We study the regulation of algorithmic (non-) collusion amongst sellers in dynamic imperfect
price competition by auditing their data as introduced by Hartline et al.[2024]. We develop an …
price competition by auditing their data as introduced by Hartline et al.[2024]. We develop an …
Hub-and-Spoke Collusion with a Third-Party Pricing Algorithm
JE Harrington Jr - Available at SSRN 5010894, 2024 - papers.ssrn.com
A new form of hub-and-spoke collusion has purportedly emerged: A data analytics company
(hub) coordinates the prices of competitors (spokes) through the pricing algorithm that it …
(hub) coordinates the prices of competitors (spokes) through the pricing algorithm that it …