A school may improve its students' job outcomes if it issues only coarse grades. Google can
reduce congestion on roads by giving drivers noisy information about the state of traffic. A …

We survey a recent and growing literature on markets for information. We offer a
comprehensive view of information markets through an integrated model of consumers …

Given a game with uncertain payoffs, information design analyzes the extent to which the
provision of information alone can influence the behavior of the players. Information design …

I introduce and study dynamic persuasion mechanisms. A principal privately observes the
evolution of a stochastic process and sends messages over time to an agent. The agent …

We characterize the set of extreme points of monotonic functions that are either majorized by
a given function f or themselves majorize f and show that these extreme points play a crucial …

A data buyer faces a decision problem under uncertainty. He can augment his initial private
information with supplemental data from a data seller. His willingness to pay for …

We propose a price-theoretic approach to Bayesian persuasion by establishing an analogy
between the sender's problem and finding Walrasian equilibria of a persuasion economy …

An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a
privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single‐crossing …

Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) represent random variables as convex functions (integrals of
the cumulative distribution function). Combining this representation with Blackwell's …

A monopolist platform uses data to match heterogeneous consumers with multiproduct
sellers. The consumers can purchase the products on the platform or search off the platform …