We study anonymous posted price mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in a Bayesian
framework. In a posted price mechanism, item prices are posted, then the consumers …

Consider a gambler who observes a sequence of independent, non-negative random
numbers and is allowed to stop the sequence at any time, claiming a reward equal to the …

We present a general framework for stochastic online maximization problems with
combinatorial feasibility constraints. The framework establishes prophet inequalities by …

We consider a monopolist seller with n heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. The
buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) …

The secretary and the prophet inequality problems are central to the field of Stop**
Theory. Recently, there has been a lot of work in generalizing these models to multiple items …

We provide a reduction from revenue maximization to welfare maximization in
multidimensional Bayesian auctions with arbitrary-possibly combinatorial-feasibility …

Abstract Systems wherein strategic agents compete for limited resources are ubiquitous: the
economy, computer networks, social networks, congestion networks, nature, etc. Assuming …

Over the past decade, an exciting connection has developed between the theory of posted-
price mechanisms and the prophet inequality, a result from the theory of optimal stop** …

We consider the classic principal-agent model of contract theory, in which a principal
designs an outcome-dependent compensation scheme to incentivize an agent to take a …

We provide prophet inequality algorithms for online weighted matching in general (non-
bipartite) graphs, under two well-studied arrival models, namely edge arrival and vertex …