Competitive situations resembling contests are ubiquitous in modern economic landscape.
In a contest, economic agents expend costly effort to vie for limited prizes, and they are …

We examine optimal information disclosure through Bayesian persuasion in a two‐player
contest. One contestant's valuation is commonly known and the other's is his private …

This paper provides a different approach to establish the uniqueness of equilibrium in
Tullock contests between two players with asymmetric valuations, when the discriminatory …

We study optimal exchange of private information in a two-player all-pay auction contest with
independent private binary values. A benevolent information center who is informed about …

We study two‐player R&D contest design using both an information disclosure policy and a
quality standard as instruments. The ability of an innovator is known only to himself. The …

The contest entails one prize and n potential bidders. Each bidder receives a signal about
the value of the prize and has a signal-dependent probability of participation. All bidders …

This paper examines the effects of disclosing the actual number of participants in innovation
contests with endogenous stochastic entry. We model innovation contests as a two-bidder …

This paper investigates whether it is optimal for a contest organizer to disclose the actual
number of contestants for total effort optimization when entry in a contest is costly and …

I analyze the optimal information disclosure problem under commitment of a “contest
designer” in a class of binary action contests with incomplete information about the abilities …

We study contests with technological uncertainty, where contestants can invest in different
technologies of uncertain value. The principal, who is also uncertain about the value of the …