Most applications of game theory assume equilibrium, justified by presuming either that
learning will have converged to one, or that equilibrium approximates people's strategic …

Artificial intelligence (AI) is starting to pervade the economic and social life. This renders
strategic interactions between humans and artificial agents more and more common. At the …

We study the role of commitment in communication and its interactions with rules, which
determine whether information is verifiable. Our framework nests models of cheap talk …

It is commonly assumed that agents will adopt Nash equilibrium strategies; however,
experimental studies have demonstrated that this is often a poor description of human …

Copious laboratory and some field evidence suggests that people err in predicting others'
behavior, learning from others' actions, and best responding to their beliefs. Some of these …

This paper develops a framework to extend the strategic form analysis of cursed equilibrium
(CE) developed by Eyster and Rabin (2005) to multi-stage games. The approach uses …

We propose a bubble game that involves sequential trading of an asset commonly known to
be valueless. Because no trader is ever sure to be last in the market sequence, the game …

In explaining the winner's curse, recent approaches have focused on one of two cognitive
processes: conditional reasoning and belief formation. We provide the first joint …

In the cognitive hierarchy (CH) framework, players in a game have heterogeneous levels of
strategic sophistication. Each player believes that other players in the game are less …

We develop a nonparametric test for consistency of player behavior with the quantal
response equilibrium (QRE). The test exploits a characterization of the equilibrium choice …