The advent of large-scale distributed systems poses unique engineering challenges. In
open systems such as the internet it is not possible to prescribe the behaviour of all of the …

A number of labor markets and student placement systems can be modeled as many-to-one
matching markets. We analyze the scope for manipulation in many-to-one matching markets …

For Bayesian games of strategic complementarities, we provide a constructive proof of the
existence of a greatest and a least Bayesian Nash equilibrium, each one in strategies that …

A step toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium is taken by
considering a double auction with n buyers and m sellers with interdependent values and …

We consider large double auctions with private values. Values need be neither symmetric
nor independent. Multiple units may be owned or desired. Participation may be stochastic …

Consider a decentralized, dynamic market with an infinite horizon and participation costs in
which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the …

We design simple mechanisms to approximate the Gains from Trade (GFT) in two-sided
markets with multiple unit-supply sellers and multiple unit-demand buyers. A classical …

Designing double auctions is a complex problem, especially when there are restrictions on
the sets of buyers and sellers that may trade with one another. The goal of this paper is to …

In electronic commerce markets where selfish agents behave individually, agents often have
to acquire multiple resources in order to accomplish a high level task with each resource …

We study an economy with traders whose payoffs are quasilinear and whose private signals
are informative about an unobserved state parameter. The limit economy has infinitely many …