Psychiatric disorders are studied at multiple levels, but there is no agreement on how these
levels are related to each other, or how they should be understood in the first place. In this …

Since Hilary Putnam offered multiple realization as an empirical hypothesis in the 1960s,
philosophical consensus has turned against the idea that mental processes could be …

The first part of this article argues that if Craver's ([2007a],[2007b]) popular mutual
manipulability account (MM) of mechanistic constitution is embedded within Woodward's …

In contemporary philosophy of science, the consensus view seems to be that scientific
explanations describe mechanisms responsible for the phenomena to be explained. Two …

Robustness is often presented as a guideline for distinguishing the true or real from mere
appearances or artifacts. Most of recent discussions of robustness have focused on the kind …

Discussions of psychological measurement are largely disconnected from issues of
measurement in the natural sciences. We show that there are interesting parallels and …

In this paper I reconstruct and evaluate the validity of two versions of causal exclusion
arguments within the theory of causal Bayes nets. I argue that supervenience relations …

How do cognitive neuroscientists explain phenomena like memory or language processing?
This book examines the different kinds of experiments and manipulative research strategies …

In recent years, the debate on the problem of causal exclusion has seen an 'interventionist
turn'. Numerous non‐reductive physicalists (eg S hapiro and S ober 2007) have argued that …

This paper argues that the interventionist account of causation faces a dilemma concerning
macroscopic causation–ie, causation by composite objects. Interventionism must either …