We investigate five different fairness criteria in a simple model of fair resource allocation of
indivisible goods based on additive preferences. We show how these criteria are connected …

Combinatorial allocation involves assigning bundles of items to agents when the use of
money is not allowed. Course allocation is one common application of combinatorial …

We prove that finding an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete for constant ε
and a particularly simple class of games: polymatrix, degree 3 graphical games, in which …

We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with additive
valuations, with the goal of maximizing the geometric mean of the agents' valuations, ie, the …

We prove that finding a Nash equilibrium of a game is hard, assuming the existence of
indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions with sub-exponential hardness. We …

Budget constraints are ubiquitous in online advertisement auctions. To manage these
constraints and smooth out the expenditure across auctions, the bidders (or the platform on …

We study the complexity of finding an approximate (pure) Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a
first-price auction with common priors when the tie-breaking rule is part of the input. We …

Competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) is a classic solution to the problem of fair
and efficient allocation of goods (Foley 1967, Varian 1974). Every agent receives an equal …

We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with additive
valuations, with the goal of maximizing the geometric mean of the agents' valuations, ie, the …

Public goods games in undirected networks are generally known to have pure Nash
equilibria, which are easy to find. In contrast, we prove that, in directed networks, a broad …