The core and balancedness

Y Kannai - Handbook of game theory with economic applications, 1992‏ - Elsevier
Publisher Summary Of all solution concepts of cooperative games, the core is probably the
easiest to understand. It is the set of all feasible outcomes (payoffs) that no player …

A theory of input–output architecture

E Oberfield - Econometrica, 2018‏ - Wiley Online Library
Individual producers exhibit enormous heterogeneity in many dimensions. This paper
develops a theory in which the network structure of production—who buys inputs from whom …

The core in perfectly competitive economies

RM Anderson - Handbook of game theory with economic applications, 1992‏ - Elsevier
Publisher Summary This chapter presents the results on the cores of perfectly competitive
exchange economies, that is economies in which the endowment of each agent is negligible …

The nonatomic assignment model

NE Gretsky, JM Ostroy, WR Zame - Economic Theory, 1992‏ - Springer
We formulate a model with a continuum of individuals to be assigned to a continuum of
different positions which is an extension of the finite housing market version due to Shapley …

Wealth effects, distribution, and the theory of organization

P Legros, AF Newman - journal of Economic Theory, 1996‏ - Elsevier
We construct a general equilibrium model of firm formation in which organization is
endogenous. Firms are coalitions of agents providing effort and investment capital. Effort is …

Pairwise stable matching in large economies

M Greinecker, C Kah - Econometrica, 2021‏ - Wiley Online Library
We formulate a stability notion for two‐sided pairwise matching problems with individually
insignificant agents in distributional form. Matchings are formulated as joint distributions over …

Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy

H Konishi, M Le Breton, S Weber - Journal of Economic Theory, 1998‏ - Elsevier
This paper examines the existence of a noncooperative equilibrium in a finite local public
goods economy where consumers have quasi-linear preferences. Jurisdictions consist of …

Some infinite-player generalizations of Scarf's theorem: Finite-coalition α-cores and weak α-cores

Z Yang - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2017‏ - Elsevier
In this paper, we first obtain some infinite-dimension versions of Scarf's theorem. Second, we
provide two generalizations of Scarf (1971) to normal-form games with infinitely many …

Some generalizations of Kajii's theorem to games with infinitely many players

Z Yang - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2018‏ - Elsevier
In this paper, we first generalize Kajii's (1992) result in Hausdorff topological vector spaces.
Second, we prove the existence of the finite-coalition α− core for games with infinitely many …

Equivalence of games and markets

MH Wooders - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1994‏ - JSTOR
The author proves an equivalence between large games with effective small groups of
players and games generated by markets. Small groups are effective if all or almost all gains …