We study a model in which voters choose between two candidates on the basis of both
ideology and competence. While the ideology of the candidates is commonly known, voters …

We compare voluntary and compulsory voting in a Condorcet-type model in which voters
have identical preferences but differential information. With voluntary voting, all equilibria …

Popular and academic discussions have mostly concentrated on large donors, even though
small donors are a major source of financing for political campaigns. We propose a theory of …

I combine a field experiment with a change in voting laws reducing the fine for abstention to
assess the effects of monetary incentives to encourage voter participation. In a real world …

I consider a two-candidate election in which there is aggregate uncertainty over the
popularities of the candidates, where voting is costly, and where voters are instrumentally …

Conventional wisdom suggests that scheduling elections concurrently with other contests
increases turnout. However, causal empirical evidence in favor of this claim is scarce, at …

We study the welfare properties of majority and supermajority rules when voting is costly and
values, costs, and electorate sizes are all random. Unlike previous work, where the …

We provide a unified analysis of the canonical rational voting model with privately known
political preferences and costs of voting. Focusing on type-symmetric equilibrium, we show …

One of the most widely discussed phenomena in American politics today is the perceived
increasing partisan divide that splits the US electorate. A contested question is whether this …

This paper analyses the effects of holding concurrent elections in multi-tiered government
structures on turnout decision and voting behaviour, based on municipal and provincial …