We study the design of negotiation strategies when a principal and agent must decide how
to split a pie while the agent's outside option changes over time. The principal's optimal …

This paper reconsiders the problem of a durable-good monopolist who cannot make
intertemporal commitments. The buyer's valuation is binary and his private information. The …

We study a bargaining model in which a buyer makes frequent offers to a privately informed
seller, while gradually learning about the seller's type from “news.” We show that the buyer's …

We discuss a few recent theoretical papers studying the dynamics of negotiations. Our focus
is on recent papers that describe bargaining “outside the void.” That is papers that model …

A buyer wishes to purchase a durable good from a seller who in each period chooses a
mechanism under limited commitment. The buyer's value is binary and fully persistent. We …

I study the role of privacy in bargaining. A seller makes offers every instant, without
commitment, to a privately informed buyer. Potential competing buyers (entrants) can …

A two‐person infinite‐horizon bargaining model where one of the players may have either of
two discount factors, has a multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Introducing the slightest …

The paper analyzes a durable goods monopoly problem in which multiple varieties can be
sold. A robust Coase conjecture establishes that the market eventually clears, with profits …

From B2B sales to AI-powered ecommerce, one common pricing mechanism is “list price–
discount”: The seller first publishes a (committed) list price, then during interactions with a …

We study a dynamic stop** game between a principal and an agent. The principal
gradually learns about the agent's private type from a noisy performance measure that can …