Prosocial religions as folk-technologies of mutual policing.

L Fitouchi, M Singh, JB André, N Baumard - Psychological Review, 2025 - psycnet.apa.org
Why do humans believe in moralizing gods? Leading accounts argue that these beliefs
evolved because they help societies grow and promote group cooperation. Yet recent …

Cooperation dynamics in spatial public goods games with graded punishment mechanism

J Quan, X Chen, W Yang, X Wang - Nonlinear Dynamics, 2023 - Springer
Punishment, as an incentive mechanism, was normally carried out with a certain fixed
probability in previous studies. But in a real legal society, recidivists are punished more than …

[HTML][HTML] Social exclusion with antisocial punishment in spatial public goods game

X Sun, L Han, M Wang, S Liu, Y Shen - Physics Letters A, 2023 - Elsevier
In the spatial public goods game (SPGG), social exclusion is an effective strategy to quickly
promote group cooperation. However, the second-order free riding occurs among …

Eco-evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the presence of policing

SN Chowdhury, S Kundu, J Banerjee, M Perc… - Journal of Theoretical …, 2021 - Elsevier
Ecology and evolution are inherently linked, and studying a mathematical model that
considers both holds promise of insightful discoveries related to the dynamics of …

Punishing second-order free riders before first-order free riders: The effect of pool punishment priority on cooperation

H Ozono, Y Kamijo, K Shimizu - Scientific reports, 2017 - nature.com
Second-order free riders, who do not owe punishment cost to first-order free riders in public
goods games, lead to low cooperation. Previous studies suggest that for stable cooperation …

Identity, kinship, and the evolution of cooperation

B Voorhees, D Read, L Gabora - Current anthropology, 2020 - journals.uchicago.edu
Extensive cooperation among biologically unrelated individuals is uniquely human. It would
be surprising if this uniqueness were not related to other uniquely human characteristics, yet …

The role of peer reward and punishment for public goods problems in a localized society

H Ozono, Y Kamijo, K Shimizu - Scientific reports, 2020 - nature.com
Cooperation in social dilemmas can be sustained if individuals are effectively rewarded or
punished from peers within the group. However, as group size increases, we inevitably face …

Benefits of asynchronous exclusion for the evolution of cooperation in stochastic evolutionary optional public goods games

J Quan, J Zheng, X Wang, X Yang - Scientific Reports, 2019 - nature.com
Mechanisms and conditions for the spontaneous emergence of cooperation in multi-player
social dilemma games remain an open question. This paper focuses on stochastic …

Pool punishment in public goods games: How do sanctioners' incentives affect us?

A Alventosa, A Antonioni, P Hernández - Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 2021 - Elsevier
Centralized sanctioning in social dilemmas has been shown to increase efficiency with
respect to standard decentralized peer punishment. In this context, we explore the impact of …

Cost–benefit analysis of full and partial river restoration: the Kishon River in Israel

N Becker, A Greenfeld, SZ Shamir - International Journal of Water …, 2019 - Taylor & Francis
Restoration of rivers is important because they provide many ecosystem services. However,
full restoration is costly, and with limited resources, the priority of the different elements of a …