We introduce a model of estimation in the presence of strategic, self-interested sensors. We
employ a game-theoretic setup to model the interaction between the sensors and the …

We study a dynamic information design problem in a finite-horizon setting consisting of two
strategic and long-term optimizing agents, namely a principal (he) and a detector (she). The …

We introduce the problem of strategic communication and find achievable rates for this
problem. The problem consists of a sender that observes a source and a receiver that would …

We consider a setting where a receiver tries to perfectly recover a source signal privately
known to a sender who can send messages via a noisy channel. However, the sender is …

During the COVID-19 pandemic the health authorities at airports and train stations try to
screen and identify the travellers possibly exposed to the virus. However, many individuals …

In strategic relationships, the control of information is an important instrument for
coordinating and incentivizing actions. In this paper, we consider a game with asymmetric …

We introduce a setting where a receiver aims to perfectly recover a source known privately
to a strategic sender over a possibly noisy channel. The sender is endowed with a utility …

We study a setting where a receiver must design a questionnaire to recover a sequence of
symbols known to a strategic sender, whose utility may not be incentive compatible. We …

We consider a setting of non-cooperative communication where a receiver wants to recover
randomly generated sequences of symbols that are observed by a strategic sender. The …

We investigate decentralized quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems when the
decision makers (an encoder and a decoder) have misaligned objective functions. We first …