The study of approximate mechanism design for facility location problems has been in the
center of research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics for the last …

In the strategic facility location problem, a set of agents report their locations in a metric
space and the goal is to use these reports to open a new facility, minimizing an aggregate …

In this work we introduce an alternative model for the design and analysis of strategyproof
mechanisms that is motivated by the recent surge of work in" learning-augmented …

Algorithms with predictions are gaining traction across various domains, as a way to surpass
traditional worst-case bounds through (machine-learned) advice. We study the canonical …

We study mechanism design with predictions for the obnoxious facility location problem. We
present deterministic strategyproof mechanisms that display tradeoffs between robustness …

Mechanism Design seeks to establish protocols for aggregating the private information of a
set of agents to optimize a global objective. Nonetheless, optimizing a communal goal solely …

We study heterogeneous $ k $-facility location games. In this model there are $ k $ facilities
where each facility serves a different purpose. Thus, the preferences of the agents over the …

Our work revisits the design of mechanisms via the learning-augmented framework. In this
model, the algorithm is enhanced with imperfect (machine-learned) information concerning …

In this paper, we investigate the Mechanism Design aspects of the $ m $-Capacitated
Facility Location Problem ($ m $-CFLP) on a line. We focus on two frameworks. In the first …

This paper investigates the Mechanism Design aspects of the $ m $-Capacitated Facility
Location Problem where the total facility capacity is lower than the number of agents …