Many real matching markets are subject to distributional constraints. These constraints often
take the form of restrictions on the numbers of agents on one side of the market matched to …

Current refugee resettlement processes account for neither the preferences of refugees nor
the priorities of hosting communities. We introduce a new framework for matching with …

Over 100,000 refugees are permanently resettled from refugee camps to hosting countries
every year. Nevertheless, refugee resettlement processes in most countries are ad hoc …

In an earlier work (Kamada and Kojima 2015), we introduced “matching with constraints,” a
two-sided matching problem in which the market is subject to feasibility constraints. That …

We consider two-sided matching problems where agents on one side of the market
(hospitals) are required to satisfy certain distributional constraints. We show that when the …

In recent years, many developments have been made in matching theory and its
applications to market design. This paper surveys them and suggests possible research …

School choice programs are implemented to give students/parents an opportunity to choose
the public school the students attend. Controlled school choice programs need to provide …

Distributional constraints are common features in many real matching markets, such as
medical residency matching, school admissions, and teacher assignment. We develop a …

In this paper, we consider two-sided, many-to-one matching problems where agents in one
side of the market (schools) impose some distributional constraints (eg, a maximum quota …

This paper considers matching problems with individual/regional minimum/maximum
quotas. Although such quotas are relevant in many real-world settings, there is a lack of …