The study of approximate mechanism design for facility location problems has been in the
center of research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics for the last …

We study the mechanism design problem of a social planner for locating two facilities on a
line interval [0, 1], where a set of n strategic agents report their locations and a mechanism …

We introduce the domain of preferences that are single-peaked on a circle, which is a
generalization of the well-studied single-peaked domain. This preference restriction is …

In this paper, we propose a fractional preference model for the facility location game with two
facilities that serve the similar purpose on a line where each agent has his location …

We study heterogeneous $ k $-facility location games. In this model there are $ k $ facilities
where each facility serves a different purpose. Thus, the preferences of the agents over the …

We study mechanism design with predictions for the obnoxious facility location problem. We
present deterministic strategyproof mechanisms that display tradeoffs between robustness …

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the
facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based …

We study the problem of locating a single facility on a real line based on the reports of self-
interested agents, when agents have double-peaked preferences, with the peaks being on …

We revisit the discrete heterogeneous two-facility location problem, in which there is a set of
agents that occupy nodes of a line graph and have private approval preferences over two …

In this paper, we study the two-facility location game on a line with optional preference
where the acceptable set of facilities for each agent could be different and an agent's cost is …