Memory corruption errors in C/C++ programs remain the most common source of security
vulnerabilities in today's systems. Control-flow hijacking attacks exploit memory corruption …

Researchers are actively exploring techniques to enforce control-flow integrity (CFI), which
restricts program execution to a predefined set of targets for each indirect control transfer to …

Microcontroller-based embedded systems are often programmed in low-level languages
and are vulnerable to control-flow hijacking attacks. One approach to prevent such attacks is …

We present the design, implementation, and evaluation of FineIBT: a CFI enforcement
mechanism that improves the precision of hardware-assisted CFI solutions, like Intel IBT, by …

This paper presents PT-CFI, a new backward-edge control flow violation detection system
based on a novel use of a recently introduced hardware feature called Intel Processor Trace …

Current control flow integrity (CFI) enforcement approaches either require instrumenting
application executables and even shared libraries, or are unable to defend against …

Multi-target tracking requires locating the targets and labeling their identities. The latter is a
challenge when many targets, with indistinct appearances, frequently occlude one another …

There has been a resurgent trend in the industry to enforce a variety of security policies in
hardware. The current trend for develo** dedicated hardware security extensions is an …

Real-time and embedded systems are predominantly written in C, a language that is
notoriously not memory safe. This has led to widespread memory-corruption vulnerabilities …

We present, VIP, an approach to boosting the precision of Virtual call Integrity Protection for
large-scale real-world C++ programs (eg, Chrome) by using pointer analysis for the first …