We propose a new notion of credibility for Bayesian persuasion problems. A disclosure
policy is credible if the sender cannot profit from tampering with her messages while kee** …

We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where a sender's utility depends only on the
expected state. We show that upper censorship that pools the states above a cutoff and …

We examine persuasion when the sole source of credibility today is a desire to maintain a
public record for accuracy. A long-run sender plays a cheap talk game with a sequence of …

We study a model of Bayesian persuasion in which the Sender commits to a signal structure,
privately observes the signal realization, and then sends a message to the Receiver at a …

A sender sells an object of unknown quality to a receiver who pays his expected value for it.
Sender and receiver might hold different priors over quality. The sender commits to a …

A principal can restrict an agent's information (the persuasion problem) or restrict an agent's
discretion (the delegation problem). We show that these problems are generally equivalent …

We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver
with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision …

Authority, as the right to instruct others and to expect obedience, is often presented as a key
mechanism for coordination. But when obedience is voluntary, how is authority sustained …

We study monotone persuasion in the linear case, where posterior distributions over states
are summarized by their mean. We solve the two leading cases where optimal unrestricted …

This paper studies dynamic agreements between a lobby and two political parties. Parties
repeatedly compete for office. The lobby decides which party to support before each …