Poa of simple auctions with interdependent values
We expand the literature on the price of anarchy (PoA) of simultaneous item auctions by
considering settings with correlated values; we do this via the fundamental economic model …
considering settings with correlated values; we do this via the fundamental economic model …
Private Interdependent Valuations: New Bounds for Single-Item Auctions and Matroids
We study auction design within the widely acclaimed model of interdependent values,
introduced by Milgrom and Weber [1982]. In this model, every bidder i has a private signal si …
introduced by Milgrom and Weber [1982]. In this model, every bidder i has a private signal si …
Private interdependent valuations
We consider the single-item interdependent value setting, where there is a single item sold
by a monopolist, n buyers, and each buyer has a private signal si describing a piece of …
by a monopolist, n buyers, and each buyer has a private signal si describing a piece of …
Constant Approximation for Private Interdependent Valuations
The celebrated model of auctions with interdependent valuations, introduced by Milgrom
and Weber in 1982, has been studied almost exclusively under private signals s_1,...,s_n of …
and Weber in 1982, has been studied almost exclusively under private signals s_1,...,s_n of …
Optimal Stop** with Interdependent Values
We study online selection problems in both the prophet and secretary settings, when arriving
agents have interdependent values. In the interdependent values model, introduced in the …
agents have interdependent values. In the interdependent values model, introduced in the …
Optimal deterministic clock auctions and beyond
G Christodoulou, V Gkatzelis… - 13th Innovations in …, 2022 - drops.dagstuhl.de
We design and analyze deterministic and randomized clock auctions for single-parameter
domains with downward-closed feasibility constraints, aiming to maximize the social welfare …
domains with downward-closed feasibility constraints, aiming to maximize the social welfare …
Prior-free clock auctions for bidders with interdependent values
V Gkatzelis, R Patel, E Pountourakis… - … on Algorithmic Game …, 2021 - Springer
We study the problem of selling a good to a group of bidders with interdependent values in a
prior-free setting. Each bidder has a signal that can take one of k different values, and her …
prior-free setting. Each bidder has a signal that can take one of k different values, and her …
Auctions with interdependence and sos: improved approximation
A Amer, I Talgam-Cohen - … , SAGT 2021, Aarhus, Denmark, September 21 …, 2021 - Springer
Interdependent values make basic auction design tasks–in particular maximizing welfare
truthfully in single-item auctions–quite challenging. Eden et al. recently established that if …
truthfully in single-item auctions–quite challenging. Eden et al. recently established that if …
Better approximation for interdependent SOS valuations
Submodular over signal (SOS) defines a family of interesting functions for which there exist
truthful mechanisms with constant approximation to the social welfare for agents with …
truthful mechanisms with constant approximation to the social welfare for agents with …
Interdependent public projects
In the interdependent values (IDV) model introduced by Milgrom and Weber [1982], agents
have private signals that capture their information about different social alternatives, and the …
have private signals that capture their information about different social alternatives, and the …